This paper estimates the impact of unemployment duration on re-employment wages.
Introduction
The causal effect of unemployment duration on re-employment wages has been widely studied in the literature. Such a concern is most common in times of crisis, when unemployment rises abruptly, and the the last crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] was not an exception. 1 There is not a single theory which justifies the earnings losses of displaced workers (Carrington and Fallick, 2015) . The loss of job-specific human capital is the most common explanation. Becker (1962) argues that there is a component of the worker's skills which is only productive at a specific job. Therefore, once the job is lost, that component cannot be transferred to another job. However, it is still possible to register wage gains after displacement, if the new job reveals a better match with the employee (Jovanovic, 1979) . Similarly, the opposite effect may occur when the previous job reveals a better match than the new one. Other theories rely on tenure to explain the costs of job displacement. As job duration increases, there is room for a positive gap between wages and productivity in order to prevent moral hazard behaviour (Lazear, 1981) . Additionally, tenure works as a quality signal to the new employer (Gibbons and Katz, 1989) . Therefore, the interruption in the job career could lead both to the loss in the productivity gap and also to a negative quality signal to the new employer, thus reducing the re-employment wage. Finally, unionism, intra-household reallocation of working hours and health are also seen as other causes for the negative effect of unemployment duration on re-employment wages. 2 While the aforementioned reasons generate a debate within the economic society, the difficulty to estimate the causal effect of unemployment on re-employment wages is in no doubt. Great part of this difficulty concerns the simultaneity present in the relationship between joblessness duration and re-employment wage, which creates an endogeneity problem.
Previous studies have recurred to a wide range of techniques in order to identify the impact of unemployment duration on re-employment wages. Yet, no consensus exist on both sign and strength of such effect. Addison and Portugal (1989) , and Schmieder et al. (2015) report negative effects; Centeno and Novo (2006) and Nekoei and Weber (2015) report positive effects; and Card et al. (2007) , Lalive (2007) , and Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) find no statistically significant effects. 3 Our study goes in line with the first two, presenting a negative statistically significant effect.
In this study we look at Portuguese administrative data between 2005 and 2012 and take advantage of the 2007 reform which have changed the rules for potential duration of unemployment benefits, in Portugal, in a non-monotonic way. That is, some of the individuals benefited from the reform, while others were prejudiced by it. Moreover, approximately 36% of them have not suffered any change in the potential duration of unemployment benefit. With this method we are able to identify an exogenous variation in the actual joblessness duration, in order to estimate the unbiased causal effect on the re-unemployment wages. Actually, according to Schmieder et al. (2015) , the potential duration of unemployment benefits may be used as an instrument since it affects joblessness durations through changes in both reservation wages and job search intensity while it demonstrates no effect on re-employment wages. 4 Recurring to the control function fashion of the instrumental variable methodology, our principal finding is the following: an increase of one additional month in unemployment duration leads to statistically significant average decrease of approximately 0.5% in re-employment wages. Such an effect is also observed when we look at earnings losses. Both results go in line with Addison and Portugal (1989) and Schmieder et al. (2015) . Additionally, we conclude that there is no evidence for the presence of endogeneity in the re-employment wage equation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the unemployment benefits systems in Portugal. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy employed and section 5 describes each of the three identification strategies in the instrumental variable approach. Section 6 presents the main results and section 7 performs a sensitivity analysis. A brief summary concludes in section 8.
3 Focusing solely on UI eligibility, instead of analysing the duration dependence, Arulampalam (2001) and Addison and Blackburn(2000) also disagree in the effect on re-employment wages. 4 Since the potential duration of unemployment benefits is not solely determined by age in our data we cannot rely only on a regression discontinuity design, as it was employed by many of the referred studies. However, following the methodology of Addison and Portugal (2008) , we use it as an alternative to our preferred instruments.
Institutional Framework

General Rules of Unemployment Benefits in Portugal
Following the European standards, the unemployment benefits' system (UB) in Portugal is divided into two subsystems: unemployment insurance (UI) and unemployment assistance (UA). 5 The former is funded by contributions from workers and employers, while the latter is funded by general government revenues. An individual is entitled to receive the UA in two cases: either it does not have the necessary requirements to get access to the UI (initial UA beneficiaries), or it has exhausted the potential duration of UI (subsequent UA beneficiaries).
In both situations the individual is means tested. 6 For a more detailed description on the UA subsystem see Lopes (2015) . For purposes of results' comparison with previous literature, we have only considered the first subsystem in this study.
In order to be entitled to the UI system, an individual must have been fired as an employee and must have been working for a minimum period. 7 Upon fulfilment of these requirements the potential duration of UI is defined according to age and past job history.
The benefit daily amount is defined according to the remunerations received during the first 12 of the 14 months previous to the date of unemployment. Although the period of subsidized unemployment contributes for the calculus of the old-age pensions, the unemployment benefits are exempted from income taxes. 8 Both potential durations and benefit amounts paid by Social Security may change due to training or occupational programs, during the period of unemployment insurance. Therefore, in order to simplify the calculations of the causal effect of potential duration of unemployment benefit on re-employment wages, we have opted to not include in our sample all the individuals that were covered by these programs. 5 For a detailed description of the unemployment benefits' evolution in Portugal see Portugal et al. (2015) 7 Note that voluntary dismissals, unless fair, are not entitled to any type of unemployment insurance. Additionally, until the last major change in in April 2012, self-employed workers were not entitled to UI 8 Under a crisis environment, the Portuguese Government has implemented a 6% tax in the unemployment benefits in 2013, which has been refused by the Constitutional Court and given back to all the beneficiaries
The 2007 reform of the unemployment benefits in Portugal
In order to tackle the increasing unemployment rate in Portugal in 2006, the Portuguese Government has implemented a major reform in the unemployment benefits system. 9 In the year preceding the reform, 2006, Portugal was facing the highest unemployment rate (8.9%) since the pre-adhesion to European Union contrasting with the slowly decreasing trend of the Euro Area (12 countries). 10 With the goal of fastening the return to the labour market, the intensity of active labour market policies has increased. At the same time, another set of measures were carried out and are briefly described below.
Firstly, the necessary working period has proportionally decreased. While before January 2007, the system required nine out of 12 months of contributions to Social Security as a mandatory condition to unemployment benefit entitlement, after this reform, the requirement period has increased to 15 months but the evaluation period has doubled to 24 months, prior to the unemployment date. With this change, after January 2007, the unemployment benefit became available to the individuals that have had irregular periods of work in the 24 months preceding displacement.
Secondly, the legal age for anticipated old-age pension has increased from 60 to 62 years old for all the individuals aged at least 57 at the date of unemployment and with at least 15 years of contributions. For all the individuals aged at least 55 at the date of unemployment and with at least 22 (instead of 30) years of contributions, the legal age has decreased from 58 to 57 years old. Note that the individuals under the first conditions may opt for the second scheme as long as they have 22 (and not only 15) years of contributions. With this change, there was still a large proportion of individuals that could benefit from what it is called the "unemployment tunnel", that is, the possibility of entering into unemployment and getting out to old-age pension without having to be re-employed in the meanwhile.
Finally the most noticeable change was that of potential duration of unemployment benefits. As it is summarized in table 1, the potential duration rule has decreased for the unemployed with small career histories. Conversely, the individuals aged below 45 years old with longer career histories have benefited from one, two, three, or four extra months of potential duration of unemployment, according to the length of the past job history. Even though the applied changes covered a large share of the unemployed individuals, it was still possible to observe individuals with the same potential duration of unemployment benefit as before. re-employment, such as illness, disability, maternity, social income or old-age pension.
Sample Construction
Due to the amount of information and the complexity of the database we have filtered the sample in order to enable the comparison of our results with previous studies in the literature. Therefore, among the 39 972 unemployed, we have decided to focus the analysis on the individuals that were covered by the basic unemployment benefit, i.e., by the unemployment insurance system described in section 2. After that, we have excluded from the analysis all the individuals that have benefited from unpredicted extensions in the potential duration of unemployment benefits, for endogeneity purposes. 
Empirical Model
In order to evaluate the impact of the unemployment duration on the post-unemployment wage we employ an instrumental variable approach. Since we use administrative data, we have no information on reservation wages. 12 Therefore, when estimating the wage equation below (in log form), it is difficult to distinguish whether post-unemployment wages (defined by the reservation wage) are driven by the duration of the unemployment spell or whether the duration of the unemployment spell is driven by the reservation wage (which in turn determines the post-unemployment wages):
where W i is the post-displacement wage of individual i, U D i is the duration of the last spell of unemployment of individual i, before re-employment and, X includes other covariates such as pre-unemployment wage, gender and age.
As it is widely proven in the literature, a change in the potential duration of unemployment benefits usually impacts the actual joblessness duration in the same direction. 13 Therefore, recurring to the 2007 reform on the potential length of unemployment benefits, necessarily, we obtain a variation in unemployment duration. 14 In the next section we describe each of the three strategies that make use of the potential duration of unemployment benefit as an instrument to the joblessness duration.
5 Identification Strategies
Strategy 1: Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefit
As a simple benchmark we use the potential duration of unemployment benefit as an instrumental variable. The fact that there is a strong relation between the potential duration of unemployment benefit and the joblessness duration makes this a good instrument to use. 12 The reservation wage is defined as the lowest remuneration a job seeker will accept to get out of unemployment (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004) . 13 See Narendranathan et al. (1985) , Meyer (1990) , Katz and Meyer (1990) , Van Ours and Vodopivec (2006) and Portugal (2004, 2008) 14 See section 2 for a detailed description on the institutional change Moreover, the fact that during the period in analysis there is a change in rules of potential duration favours the identification of the joblessness durations in our sample. In order to
give the reader a visual perspective of the actual change in the distribution of the potential duration of unemployment benefits in out sample, we present the following table of figures: Through the analysis of these four figures, we achieve three main conclusions. Firstly, the fact that potential durations of unemployment benefits for individuals aged below 45 years old were no longer defined solely by the age, after the reform. Secondly, the number of individuals that was entitled to the minimum potential duration within age group decreased along age. Conversely, the number of individuals that was entitled to the maximum potential duration within the age group increased along age. Thirdly, the major change within the last age group was a shift from 30 to 24 months of potential duration because this group had already potential extensions according to experience, before the reform.
Strategy 2: Change in Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefit
Alternatively to the first strategy, we use the change in the potential duration of unemployment benefit as another instrumental variable. The instrument is defined as the change, in months, between the potential duration of unemployment benefit for each individual and the rules in place before January 2007. Therefore, all the individuals that entered in the system before that date will have a value of zero in this variable. For all the unemployed that entered into the system after the reform, the instrument may either assume positive, negative or zero value. For the latter individuals we observe the following distribution in our sample: tial duration which are reflected, at a lower strength, in the joblessness duration. Moreover, once the same pattern does not apply to experience (control variable) and re-employment wage (outcome variable in the second stage) there is, at least, no clear relationship between the instrument and these two variables, which favour the validity of this strategy.
Results
To analyse the impact of unemployment duration on re-employment wage we estimate two different equations:
where P ostW i is the re-employment wage, P revW i is the wage before the unemployment spell, U D i accounts for the length of joblessness duration and X includes controls such as gender, age and re-employment yearly and quarterly dummies. 16 The last specification yields two main advantages. Firstly, it is possible to observe the effect of unemployment duration on the earnings gain/loss. Secondly, since we are imposing unity in the coefficient α 2 , the last specification allows us to control for permanent individual unobserved heterogeneity. 17 Note that in the first equation the previous wage will also capture part of the gender and age earnings differentials. Therefore, once we look at earnings loss, in equation (3), the opposite sign in those coefficients should be expected.
In the next subsection we present the OLS estimates for each of the aforementioned specifications and briefly discuss their coefficients. In the following subsection we present the results on each of the three empirical strategies described in section 5. First stages of the instrumental variables approach are provided in appendix B.
16 For a similar approach see Addison and Portugal (1989) . 17 As suggested by Bartel and Borjas (1981). Table 6 provides the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates for the equations (2) and (3). The coefficient estimate associated to unemployment duration is negative and significant for both specifications. That means, an increase of 10% in the joblessness duration is estimated to decrease the post unemployment wage in 0.4%, on average, ceteris paribus. Such result does not change when we look at the impact on the earnings loss. Both effects go in line with the theories reviewed in section 1. Hence, along the spell of unemployment, the individual decreases the reservation wage until it falls below the previous wage.
OLS estimates
As for the other coefficients we observe a positive large elasticity with respect to the previous wage, a significant gender gap towards male individuals and positive but decreasing effect from age. As it was predicted, the coefficients for these estimates present the opposite sign when we look at earnings loss. For example, since being a male individual contributes to a higher re-employment wage, then male individuals should expect smaller earnings losses after the spell of unemployment. Notes: usual standard errors in parenthesis below the estimates. The equations also include seven year dummies and three quarter dummies.
As it was already mentioned, theory suggests that re-employment wage and duration may be simultaneously defined. A few studies have addressed this issue by estimating the structural parameters of both wage and duration equations. 18 In the next section, we consider an instrumental variable approach to correct for the possible presence of endogeneity in unemployment duration.
Instrumental Variable Results
Considering the lack of information on reservation wages when using administrative data, the equations estimated in the previous subsection may reveal endogeneity in the duration variable. In order to address this issue we apply three alternative strategies to instrument the joblessness duration.
When estimating the first stage of this method, one should have in mind that a considerable fraction of our sample reveals incomplete spells of unemployment duration. Therefore, the fact that OLS estimates do not take into account the right-censoring in duration may lead to biased results. One alternative could be to run the first stage regression only for the completed spells. However, we would also end up with a measurement error problem. To take into account the right-censoring in unemployment duration we estimate the first stage using an accelerated failure time model (Kalbfleisch and Pretice 1980) with a lognormal distribution. 19 Moreover, by using a survival analysis model, we also take advantage on the information of the incomplete spells as a potential correction of any selectivity into re-employment. The results for each of the three strategies are presented in appendix B.
In the first strategy's results we have evidence for the concern discussed in section 5.1.
Since the potential duration is highly correlated with age, the coefficients on age groups yield a non-expected (negative) sign. However, that is compensated by the large and significant coefficient on potential duration. Consequently, when we use the change in potential duration rules, age reveals the expected (positive) sign. Finally, in the third strategy we confirm that longer duration spells are expected for the unemployed at the boundary of age groups.
18 See Chesher and Lancaster (1984), for example 19 Another alternative could be to use the proportional hazards model but note that those models are subject to the choice of the conditional probability distribution. Moreover, the accelerated failure time models tend to perform better in case of omitted covariates. By keeping in the wage equation exactly same the regressors as before, including the poten-tial endogenous variable, the new variable (correction, henceforth) will correct any potential endogeneity, thus cleaning out the effect of unemployment duration on re-employment wage.
Finally, even after this correction, there is another concern related with the validity of the usual standard errors. Since the two stages are estimated in separate steps, we have bootstrapped our sample in 1000 repetitions for all the equations in table 6.
From table 6, we can depict two relevant conclusions. Firstly, the elasticity of unemployment duration is consistently negative and significant along the three strategies. If the unemployment duration increases by 10%, the re-employment wage is expected to decrease between 0.5% and 0.6%. 20 A similar interpretation applies to the wage loss equations. Secondly, the coefficient associated to the control function approach is not statistically significant along the six specifications, thus pointing to the absence of endogeneity related to unemployment duration. The remaining coefficients do not register relevant change in comparison with the OLS estimates.
Sensitivity Analysis
In order to assess the sensitivity of our results, four robustness tests were performed along two dimensions: compositional changes in the observables and the estimation method.
First, we check whether the effect of joblessness duration on re-employment wage varies along the period of analysis, across different pre-unemployment wage quartiles, and according to whether the individual has been re-employed in a different industry. Second, we test if our estimates are subject to change when estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS, henceforth),
as an alternative to the control function approach. For simplicity, we have chosen strategy 2 for all the robustness tests, namely with the logarithm of re-employment wage as dependent variable. 21 All the results are reported in tables in appendix C. 20 Using the mean of joblessness duration in our sample, this means that each additional month implies an average decrease between 0.4% and 0.5% in re-employment wages. 21 The other specifications were also estimated and reflected no major changes in comparison to the results of the preferred specification. However, the non-significance of the third identification strategy was an exception when estimated by 2SLS, which probably is due to the nature of the discontinuity in this instrument, as well as to the small number of observations in use in this strategy.
A comparison of the estimates in the first four columns of table C1 shows that the impact of joblessness duration on the re-employment wage is decreasing along the pre-unemployment wage distribution, such that unemployed with larger pre-unemployment wages get larger wages losses in re-employment. This result seems to be consistent with two characteristics of the labour market in Portugal. While the existence of a minimum wage goes in line with the positive (non-significant) impact observed in the first quantile, the evidence for backloaded compensation in Portugal (Blanchard, 2007 and Portugal, 2006) supports the fact that workers with higher pre-unemployment wages face larger wage losses after being unemployed. 22 A similar result was find in Burda and Mertens (2001) for Germany. 23 Table C2 reports the impact of joblessness duration on the re-employment wage for individuals that have moved, or not, industry between the pre-and post-unemployment jobs, respectively. The estimates point towards smaller losses for the individuals that moved for another industry. This result could be explained by the matching literature referred in section 1. However, the test for the difference between the two coefficients revealed to be nonsignificant.
Another concern in our main estimates from table 6 could be the fact that there is a large period under our analysis in which Portugal was under a crisis environment. Such macroeconomic conditions have actually generated a catastrophic job destruction (Carneiro et al., 2014) . In order to test whether the wage losses are explained by the increase in collective The estimates presented in the first column of table C3 show that the results in table 22 See Saphiro and Stiglitz (1984) for a theoretical explanation 23 Centeno and Novo (2014) also found that low-wage workers tend to react less to benefit extensions, which may also explain the non-significant impact we observe in the first quantile of the pre-unemployment wage distribution. 
Conclusion
A broad range of methodologies have been applied to estimate the causal effect of unemployment duration on re-employment wages. In the absence of reservation wage information, it is difficult to pin down the direction of this relationship in the wage equation. The earnings loss may be determined by a longer spell of unemployment which in turn is determined by the expected re-employment wage. Our study adds two main contributions to this literature.
Taking advantage of an institutional reform on the potential duration of unemployment benefits, in January of 2007, in Portugal, we employ three different instrumental variable strategies. In a first specification, we use the potential duration of unemployment benefit itself.
While this variable yields a strong positive effect on the joblessness duration, it is strongly correlated with age and experience. Therefore, in order to clean out both effects, we present two alternative instruments. One is defined as the difference in the rules of potential duration of unemployment benefits, generated by the reform. Whereas this kind of policies usually rely on a general increase (or a general decrease) of the potential duration of the beneficiaries, this policy contains a unique feature. While 41% have benefited from longer potential duration of unemployment benefits, 23% of the individuals that became unemployed after January 2007 were entitled to smaller potential duration of unemployment benefits. Using this instrument, we can get rid of the correlation with age and even decrease substantially the correlation with experience. Finally, using the age discontinuity in potential duration of unemployment benefits, we capture the causal effect of longer potential durations, while age and experience are roughly constant.
The second main contribution is related to the procedure employed in the instrumental variable approach. Firstly, by considering the information on the incomplete spells of unemployment, we get more accurate estimates on the predicted duration (Addison and Portugal, 1989) . Moreover, it can be interpreted as an attempt to solve any selectivity on re-employment. Secondly, since we have estimated the first stage with a non-linear model The contributions of our results do not restrict to the estimate of the causal effect of unemployment duration on re-employment earnings. Actually, they lead to important policy implications. As pointed in Nekoei and Weber (2015), a positive effect would suggest that unemployment insurance subsidize search and not just leisure. Therefore, additional job assistance programs may be justified in Portugal (Carneiro et al., 2015) . On the other hand, in line with the decrease on potential duration of unemployment benefits in Portugal in 2012, from a top 38 months to 26 months, we expect that, if the joblessness duration follows the same pattern as the reform, the unemployed can actually benefit from wage gains after displacement. Nevertheless, the fact that the social subsequent unemployment benefit has increased with the reform of 2012 for individuals aged above 40 years old may lead to a counteracting effect in re-employment wages. A wider and more recent set of the data is then of the utmost importance in order to evaluate the effect of these recent policies. 24 Even though the effect is somewhat larger than the OLS estimates, the control function correction points to the absence of endogeneity in the duration of unemployment on the wage equation.
Appendices
Appendix A Appendix B Notes: standard errors in parenthesis below the estimates. The equations also include six region dummies.
Appendix C Notes: bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis below the estimates. The equations also include seven year dummies, three quarter dummies and economic activity dummies. 
